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Book Review: The Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party: Jacksonian
Politics and the Onset of the Civil War by Michael Holt
Abstract
"An impartial history of American statesmanship will give some of its most brilliant chapters to the Whig party
from 1830 to 1850," wrote James G. Blaine in his memoirs. This was not, unhappily, because of a great heritage
of political achievement in American public life. The work of the Whigs was, as Blaine admitted, negative and
restraining rather than constructive. Still, "if their work cannot be traced in the National statute books as
prominently as that of their opponents, they will be credited by the discriminating reader of our political
annals as the English of to-day credit Charles James Fox and his Whig associates—for the many evils they
prevented." If that is true, then we have not had very much in the way of "impartial" histories of American
politics since Blaine's day. No major political movement—and a party which elected three presidents and
nurtured a fourth over the span of twenty-two years can hardly be put down as minor—has suffered more
sheer dismissal, more impatient contempt at the hands of political historians than the American Whigs of
1834 to 1856. This purging of the Whigs from historical respectability really began in Blaine's own lifetime, in
the tart push-off made by Henry Adams in his Life of Albert Gallatin (1879), that "Of all the parties that have
existed in the United States, the famous Whig party was the most feeble in ideas." Never mind that Adams's
grandfather had been one of the founders of the Whigs and one of those rare intellectuals who managed to sit
in both Congress and the White House. And it continued into the twentieth century, where the political
history of the pre-Civil War years was dominated by the figure of Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., and his The Age of
Jackson (1945), a book whose title deftly managed to identify the era of the Whigs by the name of their great
political Satan. At best in these accounts, neither Whigs nor Democrats were distinguished by much which
passed for a political philosophy; at worst, the Whigs were the party of old-fogeyism or unburied Federalism.
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ALLEN C. GUELZO 
Michael Holt. The Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party: Jack 
sonian Politics and the Onset of the Civil War. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999. 
"An impartial history of American statesmanship will give some of 
its most brilliant chapters to the Whig party from 1830 to 1850," 
wrote James G. Blaine in his memoirs. This was not, unhappily, be 
cause of a great heritage of political achievement in American pub 
lic life. The work of the Whigs was, as Blaine admitted, negative and 
restraining rather than constructive. Still, "if their work cannot be 
traced in the National statute books as prominently as that of their 
opponents, they will be credited by the discriminating reader of our 
political annals as the English of to-day credit Charles James Fox and 
his Whig associates?for the many evils they prevented."1 If that is 
true, then we have not had very much in the way of "impartial" his 
tories of American politics since Blaine's day. No major political 
movement?and a party which elected three presidents and nur 
tured a fourth over the span of twenty-two years can hardly be put 
down as minor?has suffered more sheer dismissal, more impatient 
contempt at the hands of political historians than the American 
Whigs of 1834 to 1856. This purging of the Whigs from historical re 
spectability really began in Blaine's own lifetime, in the tart push 
off made by Henry Adams in his Life of Albert Gallatin (1879), that 
"Of all the parties that have existed in the United States, the famous 
Whig party was the most feeble in ideas." Never mind that Adams's 
grandfather had been one of the founders of the Whigs and one of 
those rare intellectuals who managed to sit in both Congress and the 
White House. And it continued into the twentieth century, where the 
political history of the pre-Civil War years was dominated by the 
figure of Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., and his The Age of Jackson (1945), 
a book whose title deftly managed to identify the era of the Whigs 
1. Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress: From Lincoln to Gariield (Norwich: Henry Bill, 
1884), 1:312. 
Journal of the Abraham Lincoln Association, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2001 
? 2001 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois 
This content downloaded from 138.234.152.108 on Fri, 21 Mar 2014 12:18:04 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Millard Fillmore. 
This content downloaded from 138.234.152.108 on Fri, 21 Mar 2014 12:18:04 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Allen C. Guelzo 73 
by the name of their great political Satan. At best in these accounts, 
neither Whigs nor Democrats were distinguished by much which 
passed for a political philosophy; at worst, the Whigs were the party 
of old-fogeyism or unburied Federalism.2 
Part of the success of Schlesinger's casting of antebellum America 
as Jacksonian lay in Schlesinger's identification of Andrew Jackson 
and Jackson's Democratic party with Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
and the New Deal. To this day, one comes away from The Age of 
Jackson with the clear sense that Jackson and the Jacksonians em 
bodied democracy and championed the interests of the "common 
man," while the Whigs were the voice of selfish elite interests, and 
looked like nothing so much as forecasts of Herbert Hoover and 
Robert Taft. But this may also explain why, a political generation 
after Schlesinger, the reputation of the Whigs began to stage a mi 
nor recovery. Forty years on from Franklin Roosevelt, the New Deal 
began to look less and less like the agenda of the "common man," 
and more like a smug, elitist strategy of its own, and any associa 
tion of Jacksonianism with it could only inherit its tarnish. Jackson's 
own record on race and on Indian removal further dimmed any 
interest in drawing parallels to Rooseveltian progressivism. Some 
political historians, like Ronald Formisano and Lee Benson, aban 
doned entirely the attempt to explain Jacksonianism as an antebel 
lum New Deal, and turned instead to ethnicity, kinship, or religion 
rather than political ideology, as the key to understanding the early 
Republic's political patterns; still others, moving out of studies of 
eighteenth-century Revolutionary ideology, hoped to locate the core 
of pre-Civil War American politics in the long afterwash of classi 
cal or liberal republicanism.3 But no matter which direction, the 
decay of the Roosevelt/Jackson analogy paved the way for a re 
thinking of the Whigs, and the question arose whether the Whig 
2. Edward Pessen, Jacksonian America: Society, Personality, and Politics, rev. ed. (Chi 
cago: University of Illinois Press, 1985), 197-260; Rush Welter, The Mind of America, 
1820-1860 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), 190-218; Marvin Meyers, 
The Jacksonian Persuasion: Politics and Belief (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University 
Press, 1960), 234-75. For an early dissenting voice from this stereotype, see Glyn 
don G. Van Deusen, "Some Aspects of Whig Thought and Theory in the Jackso 
nian Period," American Historical Review 58 (January 1958): 305-22. 
3. Formisano, "Toward a Reconsideration of Jacksonian Politics: A Review of the 
Literature, 1959-1975," Journal of American History 53 (June 1976): 42-65; Sean Wilentz, 
"On Class and Politics in Jacksonian America," Reviews in American History 10 (De 
cember 1982): 45-63; William G. Shade, "Politics and Parties in Jacksonian Ameri 
ca," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 110 (October 1986): 483-507. 
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complaint against Jacksonian Democracy might have had more 
substance to it than it had seemed. 
That question rose first in one of the genuinely pathbreaking 
works of American political history, Daniel Walker Howe's The 
Political Culture of the American Whigs (1979). Howe, an elegant and 
gifted writer, had already made his mark as a historian in 1970 with 
The Unitarian Conscience: Harvard Moral Philosophy, 1805-1861, a 
book that displayed, among its other virtues, a certain contrarian 
panache: not only was Howe's essay an exercise in intellectual his 
tory when all the vogue in American historical writing was the 
"new" social history, but his Harvard Unitarians had long been 
dismissed (in terms reminiscent of the Whigs) as "superficial and 
irritating," as "corpse-cold," and appallingly boring. Yet Howe 
stood the Unitarians back up on their feet, and remade them into 
a 
convincing alternative to the campmeeting revivalism which (it 
was assumed) was the only exciting version of 1830s American re 
ligion worth considering. From having questioned the accepted 
wisdom about American religion, it was only a short step to ques 
tioning the Schlesinger analogy about Jacksonian politics. Howe 
reintroduced the Whigs, not as Eastern elitists bent upon wickedly 
obstructing the righteous class-leveling justice of Jackson/Roose 
velt, but as the "sober, industrious, thrifty people," as the party of 
the American bourgeoisie, attracting the economic loyalty of small 
businesses and small commercial producers, and enlisting the po 
litical loyalty of those who aspired to transformation. Transforma 
tion was the key concept. It made the Whigs optimistic and seri 
ous all at once, since it embraced both the religious moralists and 
moral philosophers of the established denominations and colleges 
who preached personal and moral transformation as well as the 
upwardly mobile professionals who found in the dynamic world 
of international commerce the opportunity to escape from rural iso 
lation and agrarian drudgery. What Howe discovered in the Whigs 
was not merely an intellectual history. He had first thought he was 
writing a history of Whig political thought, but found that the 
mental world of the Whigs was stocked with a far broader array 
of assumptions and beliefs than mere issue politics. And so he iden 
tified Whiggery with an entire world-view, or what he called a 
political culture. 
The three most important components of that political culture 
were the Whig commitment to "improvement" (including both self 
transformation as well as national economic improvement), to mo 
rality and duty rather than equality and rights, and to national 
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unity rather than local diversity.4 Their opposition to Andrew Jack 
son and Jacksonian Democracy did not follow the lines of Schles 
inger, which pitted progressives who wanted to use an expansive 
government to help farmers and the victims of robber-baron capi 
talism against monied exploiters who wanted to keep government 
small and impotent against their greed. Instead, it was the Whigs 
who advocated an expansive federal government?but it was a 
government that would seek to promote a general liberal, middle 
class national welfare, promoting norms of Protestant morality and 
underwriting the expansion of industrial capitalism by means of 
government-funded transportation projects (to connect people and 
markets), high protective tariffs for American manufacturing, and 
a national banking system to regulate and standardize the Ameri 
can economy. Howe's Whigs were the embodiment of Horatio Alger, 
of upward striving, of the triumph of reason over passion, of the 
positive liberal state,5 and the counterparts of Disraeli's "one na 
tion" conservatism. 
By contrast, Jackson's Democrats came off as frightened, snarl 
ing, and small-mindedly anticapitalist in mentality. Jacksonianism 
glorified agriculture and defined wealth as landholding, and its 
interest in the "common man" was limited to building defenses 
around an agrarian stasis?simple subsistence farming, trade in 
kind, and no taxes, banks, or corporations?that would never be 
threatened by the demons of competition or the fluctuations of 
markets. Linked to this preoccupation with stasis and personal in 
dependence was the Jacksonians' resistance to public declarations 
of morality. Just as the Jacksonians viewed economic transforma 
tion with the same enthusiasm that an octogenarian views a roller 
coaster ride, they viewed preachers of moral transformations as a 
threat to public stability the moment those preachers went public. 
Thus, allied to economic independence was a Democratic commit 
ment to moral independence. And with that, went yet another com 
mitment, to local independence. Politically, that pushed the Demo 
crats into championing states' rights. Ethnically, it made them 
friends of the new waves of immigrants arriving in the United 
States in the 1840s, since Democrats could appear as opponents of 
efforts to homogenize immigrants into an American middle-class 
uniformity. 
4. Howe, The Political Culture of the American Whigs (Chicago: University of Chi 
cago Press, 1979), 21-22. 
5. See Howe, Making the American Self: Jonathan Edwards to Abraham Lincoln (Cam 
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), 138-41. 
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Howe managed to capture the contrast of the two political men 
talities in a single lapidary sentence: "To put things very broadly, 
the Whigs proposed a society that would be economically diverse 
but culturally uniform; the Democrats preferred the economic uni 
formity of a society of small farmers and artisans but were more 
tolerant of cultural and moral diversity."6 Turning on the hinge of 
that insight, the Whigs have succeeded in staging a minor come 
back in historical reputation. Thomas Brown, in an influential col 
lection of essays, took the Whigs as lonely exemplars of republi 
can 
statesmanship, devoted ideologically to a civic humanism and 
political impartiality that contrasted favorably with the herrenvolk 
democracy of the Jacksonians. Charles Sellers despised the Whigs 
and everything they stood for, but in 1991 he conceded that they 
"crystallized a politics that has ever since muffled the contradic 
tion between capitalism and democracy in a mythology of consen 
sual and democratic enterprise." For Harry Watson, the line of in 
fluence that ran from the Whigs to modern conservatism was even 
more 
explicit: "In effect, Whigs were defending a version of what 
today is called the 'trickle-down' theory of prosperity: promoting 
the interests of businessmen promotes the interests of all classes 
by restoring 'confidence,' leading investors to expand their activi 
ties, creating new jobs and new opportunities for the poor." Even 
John Ashworth, writing within a generally Marxist framework, is 
unpredictably sympathetic to the Whigs as "defenders of a mer 
chant-capital-based elitism against the advocates of a racially-flaw 
ed, functionally proslavery, egalitarianism."7 It remained only to 
be seen, after Howe, what a genuinely sympathetic historian of the 
Whigs might do in a comprehensive narrative of America's forgot 
6. Howe, Political Culture of the American Whigs, 20; Louise Stevenson also sum 
med up the Whig mentality with similar grace in Scholarly Means to Evangelical Ends: 
The New Haven Scholars and the Transformation of Higher Learning in America (Balti 
more: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 5-6: "Whiggery stood for the triumph 
of the cosmopolitan and national over the provincial and local, of rational order 
over irrational spontaneity, of school-based learning over traditional folk-ways and 
customs, and of self-control over self-expression." 
7. Brown, Politics and Statesmanship: Essays on the American Whig Party (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1985); Sellers, The Market Revolution: Jacksonian Ameri 
ca, 1815-1846 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 363; Watson, Liberty and 
Power: The Politics of Jacksonian America (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1990), 
219; Ashworth, Commerce and Compromise, 1820-1850, vol. 1 of Slavery, Capitalism 
and Politics in the Antebellum Republic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995), 365. 
This content downloaded from 138.234.152.108 on Fri, 21 Mar 2014 12:18:04 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Allen C. Guelzo 77 
ten party. And that bill has now been filled with Michael F. Holt's 
The Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party: Jacksonian Politics and 
the Onset of the Civil War. 
In a remarkable series of books and essays on antebellum poli 
tics over the last twenty-five years, Michael Holt has established 
himself as one of the premier American political historians, and he 
has done it while sailing into the wind of most of the changing 
fashions in American political history writing. Unlike the "ethno 
cultural" school of Benson and Formisano, who had lost faith in 
political ideology and who looked for explanations for political 
behavior in underlying, collective structures of belief, Holt remain 
ed persuaded that party identities were meaningful and worth 
while representations of conscious political choices. "Unlike other 
historians who have found conflicting sectional ideologies based 
on fundamentally different economic and social structures in the 
North and South at the core of Civil War causation ... I believe 
that the ideological values that were central were basically politi 
cal, not social, moral, or economic, and that they were shared by 
Americans in both sections," Holt wrote, with a certain defiant 
flourish, in 1978.8 Even more defiant, Holt began to focus on the 
actual mechanics of party functions?voting, organizing, patron 
age?as the keys to understanding political change, rather than 
vague, systemic, and inevitable structures of class, race, or econom 
ics. In an essay on "The Mysterious Disappearance of the Ameri 
can Whig Party," Holt viewed the demise of the Whigs in the mid 
18508 as the result of some highly localized and very mundane 
causes, such as easy "ballot access" by third parties and the im 
portance of local elections, where results could be tipped one way 
or the other by the actions and decisions of just a few voters or 
activists.9 He became convinced that "Events mattered"?rather 
than long-term "trends" or the invisible hand of markets or class? 
"they, and not just social structures, economic conditions, fixed 
political contexts, or ideology." And that conviction hardened as, 
from 1976 onwards, he began work on what he already saw as his 
magnum opus, a single massive history of the Whig party. 
That conviction also explains why The Rise and Fall of the Ameri 
can Whig Party took more than two decades afterwards to write. If 
8. Holt, The Political Crisis of the 1850s (New York: John Wiley, 1978), ix. 
9. Holt, "The Mysterious Disappearance of the American Whig Party," Political 
Parties and American Political Development from the Age of Jackson to the Age of Lincoln 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1992), 336. 
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the history of a movement is really a composite of individual 
choices and contingent events that might just as easily have gone 
one way or the other?if, in other words, human events do not obey 
great, mysterious, grand "forces" like the "class struggle" or "the 
triumph of progress" or some other rationale that helps explain 
things better than our research does?then the historian has no al 
ternative to a deep and detailed plunge into the most profound and 
numbing minutae of those choices and events. And the great con 
test would be whether, having taken that plunge into the "constant 
flux" of myriad political decisions, Holt could resurface in one life 
time and wrap it all into a coherent tale. That may be the single 
greatest professional challenge any historian faces; and with the 
results in hand, it has to be said that Michael Holt has succeeded 
beyond the dreams of the most optimistic Whig. 
Thinking this way also leaves the historian with no alternative 
to writing books of alarming length. The Rise and Fall of the Ameri 
can Whig Party weighs in at 985 pages of densely printed text (al 
most twice the words on an ordinary book page get crammed onto 
one of Holt's), followed by another two hundred pages of even 
more minuscule endnotes, plus a bibliography and index. The 
physical weight of the book comes in, literally, at close to five 
pounds. And the truth is (by Holt's own admission), that if the 
publisher had not persuaded him otherwise, it would have been a 
third again as long. One has the terrible apprehension that read 
ers who cover the entire distance will become marked in closet 
whispers as someone "who actually read all of Holt's book." If so, 
then honi soit qui mal y pense. Holt writes well and forcefully; his 
narrative never drags and never falters; his characters are vivid and 
their voices emerge with startling clarity and shrewd selection from 
the massive array of papers, documents, and books that Holt has 
mined from over two hundred archives and collections. And most 
impressive of all, he leaves all but the most truculent reader with 
a sweet taste of regret at the end, in equal parts for the end of the 
book and for the death of its subject. 
Here is Holt's story of the Whigs, in as compressed a fashion as 
possible: Rather than being a branch out of the root of Federalism, 
the Whigs evolved like the Jacksonians from the original Jeffer 
sonian Republicans who triumphed in the "Revolution of 1800." 
They were originally an opposition faction to Andrew Jackson in 
the 1820s, but they detached themselves as a separate organization 
in 1834 under the leadership of Jackson's nemesis, Henry Clay of 
Kentucky, and took the name Whig to underscore their opposition 
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to Jackson's high-handed near-dictatorship in the presidency. They 
cast themselves first as republican antimilitar is ts. They then added 
a new layer of related identity as issue-oriented nonpartisans and 
assumed after that the banner of virtuous public moralists. Finally, 
after the economic crash of 1837, the Whigs took on the identity 
that stayed them the longest, as the party of probusiness and 
prodevelopment policy. Within three years, the Whigs had staked 
out marked differently political territory from the Democrats. 
"Broadly put, Democrats were a coalition of those still outside the 
market economy who feared its spread and those who had experi 
enced and been victimized by market mechanisms. Whigs, in con 
trast, attracted those who wanted to expand the market sector be 
cause they had already enjoyed its benefits or hoped to do so in 
the future" (115). 
The 1837 economic panic also set in place the two principal 
mechanisms for Whig electoral success, which were (a) to concen 
trate public attention on the failings of Democratic politics and (b) 
to scoop up the largest percentage of new voters in every presi 
dential cycle. It is a significant point in Holt's description of ante 
bellum parties that American voters, once recruited to a party, 
rarely switched allegiances over time. What was critical in each 
presidential cycle, then, was to energize the existing Whig voter 
base by throwing their policy distinctives into sharp contrast to the 
Democrats' and by organizing new voters. When the Whigs suc 
ceeded in doing this, they scored impressive electoral successes. 
In the 1840 presidential election, the Whigs ran William Henry 
Harrison on a pro-business platform against the hapless scapegoat 
of the 1837 panic, Martin Van Buren, and won crushing victories 
in the state, congressional, and presidential contests (Harrison car 
ried nineteen of the twenty-six states). Whigs captured three-fifths 
of the new voters and triumphed, not only across the nation, but 
across all class, religious, and ethnic divisions. 
On the other hand, when the Whigs were unable to keep focused 
on these strategies, they generally lost, and lost big. The Whigs 
were 
always a minority party. Without clear partisan policy dis 
tinctions that made clear how awful an opposition victory would 
be, they discouraged their existing voter base and failed to recruit 
new voters, something that happened whenever the Whig leader 
ship allowed intraparty quarreling to bubble to the surface, or 
whenever it made the mistake of relying on charming personali 
ties to head tickets or making generous accommodations with the 
Democrats on major issues. But keeping such focus steady was an 
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ideological problem for Whigs. They prided themselves on being 
a coalition of independent thinkers, unlike (in their imagination) 
the disciplined faithful of the Democrats, and they did not hesi 
tate to turn on each other with divisive and disheartening aban 
don. Linked to that, the Whigs valorized the image of themselves 
as statesmen rather than (like their opposite numbers) party hacks 
who loved politics only for the power political office conferred. 
Sacrificing party for the nation, they would join hands with Demo 
crats to serve the nation's good?and then be punished at the polls 
afterwards by voters who saw no reason why they should vote 
Whig rather than Democrat. The most hideous example of this form 
of self-mutilation occurred immediately after the Whigs' great tri 
umph in 1840. In a gesture of independent nonpartisanship, the 
Whigs nominated former Democrat John Tyler as Harrison's run 
ning mate. When Harrison died prematurely in 1841, Tyler as 
sumed the presidency and promptly split the Whig majority in 
Congress into violently quarreling factions. As a result, disgusted 
Whig voters stayed home on election days from 1841 to 1848, and 
the Whigs' majorities in the states and in Congress ebbed; in the 
1842 by-elections they "suffered one of the most staggering rever 
sals in off-year congressional elections ever witnessed in Ameri 
can history" (151). 
The Whigs, however, displayed an unusual resiliency. As a mi 
nority party, they were not shocked to find themselves outsiders, 
and they demonstrated a willingness to wait and let the Democrats 
dig their own graves. Whig candidates staged a comeback in the 
1846 congressional elections (the year that Abraham Lincoln won 
election as a Whig congressman in Illinois), and in 1848, they nomi 
nated the artfully ambiguous Zachary Taylor, who distracted at 
tention away from Whig intraparty feuding and managed, almost 
too late, to get public attention concentrated on a post-Mexican War 
recession that could be conveniently hung around the necks of the 
Democrats. By focusing the public on the Democrats' mistakes, 
Taylor's election might have spelled a second great opportunity to 
establish Whig dominance in the electoral system. Again, the Whigs 
stumbled on the threshold of victory. Widespread dissatisfaction 
with the Taylor administration's well-intentioned effort to rise 
above partisanship in patronage appointments depressed Whig 
voter turnout in the 1849 congressional elections, and Whig can 
didates fell in droves. Taylor's death in offic? in 1850 opened the 
way to more intramural bloodletting among Whigs, and when his 
successor, Millard Fillmore, joined with congressional Democrats 
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and endorsed the Compromise of 1850, the seeds were sown for 
even more lethal quarrels, as Northern Whigs began to suspect that 
the Whig party had become too beholden to Southern slaveholding 
interests. 
By endorsing the Compromise of 1850, Fillmore believed that he 
was 
only playing the appropriate role of disinterested Whig states 
man, putting the interests of national unity over the selfish desires 
of Northern Whig opponents to slavery. What he actually did was 
to invite Whig voters not to bother voting for Whigs, since the 
policy results were apparently the same, no matter which candi 
dates they voted for. Fillmore also failed to keep the Whigs from 
descending into new rounds of internal dissension, this time be 
tween Northern and Southern Whigs, rather than on public dis 
content with Democrats. Knowing full well that this spelled defeat 
in 1852, anxious Whigs tried to repeat their 1848 triumph by dump 
ing Fillmore and substituting Mexican War hero Winfield Scott, 
relying on Scott's personality as a vote-getter. Policies, however, 
not personalities, were what got Whigs elected. What was worse, 
Scott was a political malaprop. Accordingly, the Whigs were mas 
sacred at the polls, "because they distrusted Scott, expected defeat, 
or were 
simply indifferent to the outcome of a personality contest 
with no clear programmatic differences at issue" (758). 
Many Whigs in 1852 expected that, having learned their lesson 
twice about what kind of campaign did not work, they would need 
only to wait on the sidelines for new Democratic catastrophes to 
provide issues and then rally behind another Harrison or Taylor 
to win a third victory. But by the mid-1850s, the mechanics of 
American politics had changed. New issues, like slavery, proved 
divisive rather than unifying for the Whigs; new, and sometimes 
flukey, political movements (like the Know-Nothings) easily carved 
into Whig constituencies, first because the Whigs prided them 
selves on the absence of the party discipline that would have kept 
those constituencies safe, and then because the 1850s had none of 
the disincentives for third-party movements (party registrations, 
qualifications for federal matching funds) that cripple modern 
third-party efforts. But the most obvious factor that changed the 
landscape was, simply, Whig defeats. The impact of political loss 
is cumulative. A party cannot indefinitely spring back anew with 
a new issue or a new candidate or a new election. Twenty years of 
defeats had simply worn down the old Whig leadership, many of 
whom (like Whig national chairman Truman Smith) called it quits 
on politics. 
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The onset of the Kansas-Nebraska controversy in 1854 was the 
death knell of the Whigs, but not necessarily because (as is com 
monly assumed) Northern and Southern Whigs promptly parted 
company and fled either to the Democrats or to new fusion par 
ties like the Republicans. (Actually, Southern Whigs were ready to 
join with Northern Whigs in denouncing Kansas-Nebraska as reck 
less expansionism until the famous Appeal of the Independent Demo 
crats cast Kansas-Nebraska as a litmus-test issue on one's loyalty 
as a Southerner to slavery). A substantial number of both South 
ern and Northern Whigs tried to keep the party together through 
1856. What finished the Whigs was their failures, not over national 
policy questions, but in the state and congressional elections in 1854 
and 1855, where the new parties could get the most ready purchase 
on the electorate. No longer did Whig voters, galvanized by Demo 
cratic awfulness, take their votes to Whig candidates to express 
their disgust; they could go to the Know-Nothings, to the Free 
Soilers, the Republicans, and so on. By 1855, some Whigs went to 
the desperate length of joining the Know-Nothings in the hope of 
converting it into a new national Union party; others (like Lincoln) 
for whom antislavery was the major issue of the day, departed for 
the Republicans. After the 1856 election, the Whigs were dead as 
a national organization. Their last presidential nominating conven 
tion, in Baltimore in 1856, attracted only 144 delegates, half of them 
from New York. 
Telling over Holt's story in this fashion does him a tremendous 
methodological injustice, since (like the political narratives he criti 
cizes the most) it highlights only the presidential elections. Holt's 
contention from first to last in this book is that the story of the 
Whigs as a national party is indisseverable from the story of the 
Whigs as a local and state party. For one thing, the voice of local 
politics was the voice of national constituencies, which elected of 
ficials disregarded at their peril. "State legislatures and state nomi 
nating conventions met while congressional Whigs struggled with" 
major national problems and "what happened in those legislatures 
and conventions decisively influenced Whigs' behavior in Con 
gress, just as developments in Washington shaped how rival Whig 
factions opposed each other within the states" (460). That influence 
was underscored by every election of a new United States senator, 
since senatorial seats were still filled then by votes in the state leg 
islature, and a poor showing by Whigs in local elections would 
have a domino effect right up to the Senate. Above all, there was 
the business of patronage. Patronage was the life's blood of nine 
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teenth-century American politics?it was the only reward system 
for otherwise unrequited faithful party service?and failure to 
award patronage according to local expectations of desert was the 
death warrant for any thoughtless national politico. (Lincoln, of 
course, drops out of Whig political life as a candidate after his dis 
appointment over patronage under the Taylor administration). By 
far the largest parts of this large book are dedicated to fleshing out 
these secondary and tertiary stories of Whig state politics and how 
they intersected with the larger fate of the Whigs as a national 
party. And these are great stories?the Sewardites and Silver Grays 
in New York; Howell Cobb, Alexander Stephens, John M. Berrien 
and the Chivalry in Georgia; the Johnston and anti-Johnston Whigs 
of Pennsylvania. And Holt clearly revels in the telling of them, in 
the local cut-and-thrust of politics, of the ill-timed public letter, of 
the public witticism that gets twisted by skilled opponents around 
a candidate's neck for life, of desertions, reconciliations, petty vin 
dications, and even pettier vindictiveness. 
Sooner or later, the importance of Abraham Lincoln as a Whig 
intrudes into any discussion of the rise and fall of the Whig party. 
Part of what has kept historical interest in the Whigs alive at all 
has been linked to the recollection that Lincoln was a Whig and a 
Whig officeholder, and a healthy percentage of Holt's readership 
will find the chief appeal of Holt's book in the possibility of find 
ing a fresh way of situating Lincoln in the context of his early ca 
reer as a Whig partisan. Like the Whig party in general, our ap 
preciation of Lincoln as a Whig has come comparatively late. The 
major biographies, from Herndon, through Tarbell and Beveridge, 
to Oates, give Lincoln's Whiggism little more than skimming, and 
it was one of the major disappointments of David Donald's 1995 
Lincoln that it treated Lincoln's Whiggism so slightingly. (That last 
oversight was all the more puzzling, since Donald had been one 
of the first to resurrect Lincoln's Whig party allegiance as a criti 
cal part of understanding Lincoln's presidency in his early essay, 
"Abraham Lincoln: A Whig in the White House"10). But acknowl 
edgement of the importance of Whiggism for Lincoln has risen as 
the reputation of Whiggism has staged its return. Daniel Walker 
Howe devoted an entire chapter to Lincoln in The Political Culture 
10. Donald, Lincoln Reconsidered: Essays on the Civil War Era, 2d ed. (New York: 
Knopf, 1956), 187-208; before Howe's Political Culture, the only significant, and sym 
pathetic, appreciation of Lincoln's Whiggism was Gabor S. Boritt's Lincoln and the 
Economics of the American Dream (Memphis, Tenn.: Memphis State University Press, 
1977). 
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of the American Whigs, which ranks as one of the finest essays ever 
written on Lincoln's political life. Joel Silbey's "'Always a Whig in 
Polities': The Partisan Life of Abraham Lincoln" boldly cast Lin 
coln as "a partisan Whig ideologist and spokesman for his party's 
cause in campaign and legislative debate" whose "Whiggery im 
pinged on everything else he became and did."11 
Those who are looking for Holt to do likewise in The Rise and Fall 
of the American Whig Party will experience some measure of disap 
pointment, since Lincoln makes only a dozen fleeting appearances 
across Holt's sprawling manuscript. And yet, no one will get a full 
sense of the context of Lincoln's Whiggism without Michael Holt's 
help. Understanding the need of the Whigs to organize around is 
sues rather than relying on personalities is what makes sense of 
Lincoln's comment in 1843 that the cause of the Whig defeats is that 
"tens of thousands, in the late elections, have not voted at all." 
Who and what are they? is an important question, as respects 
the future. They can come forward and give us the victory 
again. That all, or nearly all of them, are whigs, is most ap 
parent. Our opponents, stung to madness by the defeat of 1840, 
have ever since rallied with more than their usual unanimity. 
It has not been they that have been staid from the polls. These 
facts show what the result must be, once the people again ral 
ly in their entire strength.12 
Lincoln's victory in the Seventh District congressional election of 
1846 also has its place in the overall Whig comeback in 1846, as 
does his disappointed withdrawal from Whig activism after his 
failure to secure the Land Office appointment from the Taylor ad 
ministration and his determined clinging to the Whigs until 1856 
in the hope that the party could yet surmount even the Kansas 
Nebraska debacle to become a party of Union. And, as Donald and 
Boritt have pointed out long before, much of what became Lin 
coln's domestic agenda during the Civil War was really the old 
11. Silbey, "Always a Whig in Polities': The Partisan Life of Abraham Lincoln," 
Papers of the Abraham Lincoln Association 8 (1986): 21-42; see also Howe, "Why Abra 
ham Lincoln was a Whig," Journal of the Abraham Lincoln Association 16 (Winter 1995): 
27-38. 
12. 
"Campaign Circular from Whig Committee," March 4,1843, in Roy P. Basier, 
ed., The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, 9 vols. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers 
University Press, 1953-1955), 1:316. 
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Whig economic program of tariffs, business subsidies, and national 
banking. Even if Lincoln himself appears personally at only a few 
points in The Rise and Fall of the American VMiigs, the book itself is 
the shadow that Lincoln's political life casts. 
It also casts some other, longer, shadows. Holt does not hesitate, 
by the end of the book, to number himself among the "admirers 
of the Whig party," and perhaps for that reason he regards their 
disappearance not only as a political loss, but as a cause of the Civil 
War. Without the stabilizing effect of two national parties, and even 
more, without the at-any-cost commitment of the Whigs to national 
union, the only alternative antislavery Northerners had at the polls 
in 1860 was the Republicans. But the Republicans were, despite 
their protests, a sectional rather than a Union party, and the elec 
tion of a Republican president "provoked Deep South secession 
and the subsequent war" (981). This forces Holt into endorsing the 
proposition that the war was avoidable, and perhaps unnecessary, 
if only the Whigs could have tempered the ferment of secession in 
1860 as they had in 1850. (Indeed, the avoidability of the war is 
almost an inevitable corollary of his belief in the overall contin 
gency of historical events, that one action or one movement can, 
in the right circumstances, radically alter the course of events). 
Oddly, no one might have disagreed with that more than Lincoln, 
the Whig partisan who regarded the war as the necessary collision 
of two inalterably opposed principles rather than a breakdown in 
political mechanics. Odder still, Holt's commitment to contingency 
forces him to slight the role of the Whig ideology at the expense 
of the Whig political mechanics in the larger world of Whig poli 
tics. There is, surprisingly, very little here on the political ideology 
of Whiggery. And while that can, perhaps, be excused on the 
premise that Howe's work covers that ground well enough, its ab 
sence has more than a little to do with Holt's preference for em 
phasizing the historically contingent over the historically necessary, 
since ideology is a function of logical consistency, and the logical 
consistency of ideas spells precisely the sort of inevitability Holt 
would prefer to subvert. 
But these are small matters, so small that they are raised almost 
as a 
sympathetic gesture of Whiggish nonpartisanship than real 
criticism. The totality of Holt's work is so enormous, and so reveal 
ing of the political world that Lincoln inhabited and then wrote 
large as the nation's agenda during the Civil War, that few enough 
words exist in the scholarly vocabulary to describe the debt we owe 
to Holt as readers. Lincoln was, as we know, the first Republican 
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president; Holt makes clear how he may as well be considered the 
last Whig president. Or perhaps, with more provocative accuracy, 
Holt's anatomy of the Whig party makes it clear how Lincoln re 
vived the Whig agenda (even its unionism, by converting the Re 
publican party in 1864 into a "National Union" party and, with less 
happier results, replaying the disaster of 1841 by running with 
Andrew Johnson, the Tennessee Democrat, as vice president) and, 
more than Harrison, Taylor, or Fillmore could ever have hoped, 
installed that agenda as a permanent feature of American political 
life. It will escape the notice of no attentive reader that the twin 
mechanisms by which the Whig party assured itself of political 
success have also been the mechanisms that have won national 
elections for Lincoln's Republican heirs in the twentieth century, 
and that much of the Whig political culture lives on (at least in the 
rhetoric) of twentieth-century Republicanism. Indeed, taken to 
gether with Howe, the consistency of the larger psychology of 
Whigs and Democrats in the nineteenth century bears much more 
than incidental resemblance to the political psychology of Jeffer 
son's and Lincoln's modern-day descendants. Perhaps the rise and 
fall of the Whigs, as Holt has lined it out, was not so final a fall as 
it seemed. 
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